INTRODUCTION
Cognitive modeling began in the mid-1950s as a tool for studying the relationship between the structure of the environment and behavior. The work of Herbert Simon and Paul Fitts exemplifies the shared view of limited human capacities and the importance of the task environment that characterized cognitive modeling in the emerging cognitive science and human factors communities.
In his influential Psychological Review paper, Simon (1956) championed the emerging information-processing approach that would later become cognitive psychology and contrasted it with the models postulated by economists, saying that "in almost all respects the latter [economists] postulate a much greater complexity in the choice mechanisms, and a much larger capacity in the organism for obtaining information and performing computations, than do the former [psychologists]" (p. 129). The engineering psychologists |of the day are well represented by Paul Fitts, who, busily developing information-processing approaches to modeling motor movement, concluded that "the fixed information-handling capacity of the motor system probably reflects a fixed capacity of central mechanisms" (Fitts, 1954, p. 391 ). Simon's (1956) main point in his article, that adaptive behavior depends "upon the structure of the environment" (p. 130), was also one shared by Fitts (1958) , who defined the aims of engineering psychology as providing "quantitative data on human performance characteristics . . . as a function of task variables" (p. 269). Objective: In this article, I present the ideas and trends that have given rise to the use of cognitive architectures in human factors and provide a cognitive engineering-oriented taxonomy of these architectures and a snapshot of their use for cognitive engineering. Background: Architectures of cognition have had a long history in human factors but a brief past. The long history entails a 50-year preamble, whereas the explosion of work in the current decade reflects the brief past. Understanding this history is key to understanding the current and future prospects for applying cognitive science theory to human factors practice. Method: The review defines three formative eras in cognitive engineering research: the 1950s, 1980s, and now. Results: In the first era, the fledging fields of cognitive science and human factors emphasized characteristics of the dancer, the limited capacity or bounded rationality view of the mind, and the ballroom, the task environment. The second era emphasized the dance (i.e., the dynamic interaction between mental operations and task environment). The third era has seen the rise of cognitive architectures as tools for choreographing the dance of mental operations within the complex environments posed by human factors practice. Conclusions: Hybrid architectures present the best vector for introducing cognitive science theories into a renewed engineering-based human factors. Application: The taxonomy provided in this article may provide guidance on when and whether to apply a cognitive science or a hybrid architecture to a human factors issue.
Although Simon and Fitts recognized two of the three elements of the current approach to cognitive science and cognitive engineering, it is clear that they and their immediate intellectual descendants emphasized the dancer (bounded cognition) and the ballroom (the task environment) but largely ignored the dance -that is, the interplay of the diverse set of mental resources with a dynamic task environment.
A sympathetic reading of history is that it would have made little sense to worry about the dance before we had a better understanding of the dancers -that is, our limited-capacity resources. Indeed, this "divide-and-conquer" approach to human cognition did lead to advances in cognitive theory and human factors practice (e.g., Fisk & Schneider, 1981; Schneider, 1985; Shepard, 1963; Sperling, 1963) . However, as Newell (1973) pointedly put it, "You can't play 20 questions with nature and win," an approach that focuses on the dancers and ballroom but not the dance cannot take us to our goal of understanding the human mind at work in complex task environments.
Between the 1950s and the 1980s, human factors researchers began to believe that progress could be made on persistent problems such as cognitive workload by designing the task environment to facilitate the dance of multiple resources (Klapp & Netick, 1988; Logan, 1988; Polson & Friedman, 1988; Wickens & Liu, 1988; Wickens, Mountford, & Schreiner, 1981; Wickens, Sandry, & Vidulich, 1983) . Likewise, the solid and reliable human factors workhorse of task analysis (Kirwan & Ainsworth, 1992; Shepherd, 1998 Shepherd, , 2001 ) was extended downward into the realm of immediate interactive behavior, where cognitive, perceptual, and motor processes interacted directly with each other as well as with the task environment (Card, Moran, & Newell, 1983) .
Between the 1980s and now, cognitive architectures have emerged from the cognitive science community (Anderson, 1983 (Anderson, , 2007 Anderson & Lebiere, 2003; Elman et al.,1996; Kieras & Meyer, 1997; Newell, 1990; O'Reilly & Munakata, 2000; Schneider & Chein, 2003) as a tool for basic research. Cognitive architectures enable a type of cognitive modeling that emphasizes the interplay and control of multiple resources. Different architectures emphasize different sets of resources. Indeed, modeling the control of the integrated cognitive system is an active area of contemporary research and theory (Gray, 2007b; Monsell & Driver, 2000) , with new architectures emerging and older architectures changing almost monthly. (An interesting discussion of the limits and progress of architectures of cognition is provided by the Newell Test, a list of 12 criteria for architectures proposed by Anderson and Lebiere [2003] , which was inspired by various writings on this subject by Allen Newell.) In the next section, we skip from Simon (1956) and Fitts (1954) to the early 1980s. Here we discuss the first attempts to choreograph the dance -that is, to put information gleaned about cognitive, perceptual, and motor processes into a form that could be used by human factors professionals. We then jump ahead another 20 years to the new century to discuss types of architectures and how they have been used in cognitive engineering.
DEFINING THE DANCE STEPS OF A COUPLED SYSTEM: TASK ANALYSIS FOR COGNITIVE ENGINEERING
Once the strategy was selected, the course of the search depended only on the structure of the problem, not on any characteristics of the problem solver. (Simon, 1969, pp. 30-31) Simon's (1969) statement places into words an open secret long known by the human factors community -namely, that almost any human behavior that extends in time longer than a few minutes can be conceived of as a hierarchical series of tasks and subtasks. The structure of this hierarchy is, for the most part, determined by the nature of the task and task environment and less so by the human operator. Rather than having to deal with hours of behavior as one unit, the human factors analyst can break the behavior down to the level required by the goals of the analysis.
However, before cognitive engineering could take advantage of this open secret, cognitive science had to define the right level of functional analysis. During the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, cognitive models tended to focus on operations such as the problem-solving steps involved in cryptarithmetic problems (Newell & Simon, 1972) or writing a statement in a programming language (Anderson, Conrad, & Corbett, 1989) . Although such steps were structured by the tasks being performed, they were at too high a level of analysis to reveal the coupling of brain-based and world-based systems (Clark, 2007) . For cognitive engineering, this disembodied approach to cognition changed radically with the publication of The Psychology of Human-Computer Interaction (Card et al., 1983) . Card et al. (1983) defined a new construct, the unit task, that "is fundamentally a control construct, not a task construct" (p. 386); that is, the unit task "partitions the behavior stream" (p. 385) beneath the level at which the task hierarchy is defined by the task itself and at the level at which task structure is defined by the control problems faced by the user. Unit tasks range in duration from 3 to 30 s, with an internal structure composed of steps that range in duration from 1/3 to 3 s. Although many of the steps within a unit task retain a purely in-the-head flavor, many steps implicitly combine cognitive and perceptual or cognitive and motor resources in interactions with the task environment (for examples of recent analyses of complex tasks at the unit task level, see Sohn, Douglass, Chen, & Anderson, 2005; Taatgen & Lee, 2003) .
In a subsequent development, the steps of a unit task were fragmented into networks of cognitive, perceptual, and motor operations, with the operations of different steps interleaved in an activity network formalism (Gray & BoehmDavis, 2000; Gray, John, & Atwood, 1993; John, 1990; Schweickert, Fisher, & Proctor, 2003) . As Figure 1 suggests, this formalism provided an important step toward choreographing the dance among cognitive, perceptual, motor, and environmental resources. (2), and GREET-CUSTOMER. Each step is broken down into the cognitive, perceptual, and motor operations required to perform that step in the phone operator's task environment (workstation and customer). The middle row shows cognitive operators with a default execution time of 50 ms each. Above that line are the perceptual operators (separate lines for visual and aural operators), and below it are the motor operators (separate lines for eye movement and speech; note that no hand movements are required in this part of the unit task). The flow of operators is from left to right with connecting lines indicating dependencies. Within an operator type, the dependencies are sequential. However, between operator types, the dependencies may be parallel. The numbers above each operator indicate the time, in milliseconds, for that operator to execute. Time is accumulated from left to right along the critical path. Differently textured backgrounds are used to group the operators for each of the four steps. This grouping shows that the three operators of the LISTEN-FOR-BEEP step are interleaved with the four operators of the READ-SCREEN(1) step.
It may seem curious that this major beachhead for applying cognitive science theories to human factors practice was in human-computer interaction (HCI) rather than mainstream human factors (Card, Moran, & Newell, 1980a , 1980b Card et al., 1983; Newell & Card, 1985; Norman, 1981 Norman, , 1982 Norman, , 1986 . In a sense, this beachhead represents a simple case of science and engineering practice following technological developments. The 1980s saw a shift of work of a large segment of the white-collar workforce to computers. The use of this technology allowed detailed, keystrokelevel logs to be collected and analyzed with the same care and precision previously available only in the experimental psychology laboratory. The applications of these techniques to the larger human factors community lagged their application to HCI and had to await the digitization or digital simulation of large-scale systems.
CHOREOGRAPHING THE DANCE: COGNITIVE ARCHITECTURES FOR COGNITIVE ENGINEERING
The impetus for developing and using architectures within the human factors community has been our need to bring the engineering-style approach of the human factors community (Byrne & Gray, 2003) into increasingly complex task environments. The types of cognitive architectures deployed by the human factors community reflect the ambitions of the researchers as well as the scope of the problems they are tackling.
New architectures are born almost monthly, but old ones never die. They just fade away. In one of the first taxonomies of architectures, Pew and Mavor (1998) identified and discussed 12. Five years later, Ritter et al. (2003) added 7 to this list, whereas Morrison's (2003) review added 7 more. A few years later, Langley, Laird, and Rogers's (2006) review listed 15 architectures that were not mentioned by the prior reviews. Finally, the Wikipedia entry for cognitive architectures retrieved the week before this article was submitted to the journal (February 22, 2008 ; http:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_architecture) adds 9 architectures that are not discussed by these other four sources. Taken as a group, these five sources review 50 architectures, and although this set of 50 may be exhausting, it is certainly not exhaustive. As I view an exhaustive listing to be futile, my more modest goal is to provide the reader with a taxonomy (see Figure 2 ) that might help sort through the various architectures while providing a guide to the cognitive engineering contributions that might be expected from different categories of this taxonomy.
Architectures for Developing Cognitive Science Theory (Figure 2, Box 1) The vast majority of architectures are developed by one or two researchers as research tools for exploring and developing cognitive science theory. Of these, most are used only by the developers and their students and are used only for basic research. This category, Architectures Only Used for Basic Research (Figure 2 , Box 1.A), is outside the scope of this review and will not be discussed further.
Of more interest to the readers of this journal is the category of Architectures Occasionally Used for Cognitive Engineering (Figure 2 , Box 1.B). This category entails the application of basic research systems such as ACT-R, EPIC, Soar, the Queuing Network Model Human Processor (QN-MNP) (Liu, Feyen, & Tsimhoni, 2006) , or connectionist architectures (e.g., Schneider & Chein, 2003) "out of the box," with no significant changes to the underlying architecture.
In terms of application domains, successes of this approach have included the modeling of pilot performance in uninhabited air vehicles (Gluck, Ball, & Krusmark, 2007) , taxiing on runways by commercial airline pilots (Byrne & Kirlik, 2005) , flight deck displays and radar systems (Fu et al., 2006; Gray, Schoelles, & Myers, 2002; Schoelles & Gray, 2001; Wickens, Sebok, Bagnall, & Kamienski, 2007) , improving the design of handheld devices (St. Amant, Horton, & Ritter, 2007) , the classic human factors topic of graph reading (Peebles & Cheng, 2003) , and the closely related topic of diagrammatic reasoning (Ritter & Bibby, in press ).
This approach has also been applied to model various effects of interest to the human factors community. Such effects include multitasking (Kieras, Meyer, Ballas, & Lauber, 2000; Liu et al., 2006) , interruptions (Altmann & Trafton, 2002) , task switching (Altmann & Gray, 2008, in press ), mental workload (Wu & Liu, 2006a) , human error (Byrne & Bovair, 1997; Byrne & Davis, 2006; Gray, 2000) , menu search (Byrne, 2001; Hornof, 2001 ), and dual-task performance (Schneider & Detweiler, 1988) . To a large degree, success in these types of efforts reflects the successful advance in the ability of cognitive theory to account for increasingly complex behavior in increasingly complex task environments. The limitations of this approach help emphasize the limits of theory-based architectures in accounting for the whole of human cognition (see also the comment by Gray, Schoelles, & Myers, 2003 , on the Anderson & Lebiere, 2003 .
Hybrid Architectures for Cognitive Engineering (Figure 2, Box 2)
Hybrid architectures freely mix components derived from machine learning, control theory, artificial intelligence, mathematical modeling, or standard programming techniques with components that are firmly grounded in cognitive theory. Gray and colleagues have referred to such hybrids as simBorgs (Gray, Schoelles, & Veksler, 2004; Myers, Neth, Schoelles, & Gray, 2004) . As cognitive architectures were created as a tool with which to study the control of the integrated cognitive system (Gray, 2007a; Kieras, 2007) , a major distinction among hybrid architectures is whether control and interleaving of the components of the architecture are based on cognitive theory or whether this control is one of the noncognitive, hybrid, components of the architecture.
Hybrids emphasizing cognitive theories of the control of cognitive systems (Figure 2, Box 2.A).
Those systems that largely conform to the control imposed by cognitive theory include the ACT-Rbased and QN-MNP-based models of driver performance (Salvucci, 2006; Wu & Liu, 2006b; Wu, Tsimhoni, & Liu, 2007) . In contrast, the SNIF-ACT models of information search replace the ACT-R 5.0 (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998) model of control with a theory-based alternative (Fu & Pirolli, 2007; Pirolli, 2007) .
Notable in this category is the Soar family of hybrid architectures (Wray & Jones, 2006 ) that maintain the control structure of Soar while developing models that generate humanlike behavior for large-scale military simulations. These models include TACAIR-Soar (Jones et al., 1999; Tambe et al., 1995) and MOUTBots (Wray, Laird, Nuxoll, Stokes, & Kerfoot, 2005) .
The subcategory of hybrids that emphasize cognitive control in dynamic task environments is Interactive Cognitive Agents (Figure 2 , Box 2.A.1). This interaction requires the careful choreographing of multiple cognitive, perceptual, and motor resources. Interestingly, all of the systems discussed in this section (i.e., Figure 2 , Box 2.A) belong to this taxonomic subcategory. Although I was unable to find nonembodied exemplars of this category, they seem feasible (and are represented in Figure 2 , Box 2.A.2). For example, one could imagine modeling the interplay between bounded memory and bounded attention during a complex decision-making task. If such decision making did not rely on external resources, then the model would be a member of this category of hybrids (Box 2.A) but would not be considered an interactive cognitive agent (Box 2.A.1).
Hybrids incorporating noncognitive control of some cognitive components (Figure 2 , Box 2.B). More common in cognitive engineering practice are hybrid architectures that avoid the troublesome issues of modeling the human control system and rely on standard computer science techniques for controlling a complex software system. The scope of such systems varies widely along a number of dimensions.
A notable example (Figure 2 , Box 2.B.1) of a very specialized hybrid is VDM2000 (Witus & Ellis, 2003) . This may be considered an architecture in that it consists of subcomponents that model human early vision, object recognition, and basic psychophysics to provide "a criterionindependent measure of target conspicuity" (Witus & Ellis, 2003, p. 47) . VDM2000 is very successful at what it does -namely, accurately predict the detection of hidden military targets, in daylight, by the unaided human eye.
A class of hybrids with a long lineage within the cognitive engineering community includes COGNET/iGEN (Zachary et al., 2005; Zachary, Ryder, & Hicinbothom, 1998) and the SAINT family (SAINT, MicroSAINT, IMPRINT, etc.) . (For an excellent and recent discussion of these systems, see Pew, 2007 .) The control structure for these architectures is explicitly not modeled on human control but takes the form of an activity network (Schweickert et al., 2003 ) (see Figure 2 , Box 2.B.2). These architectures were developed to simulate the human element in large man-machine systems. As such, details of individual human cognition were not viewed as particularly important. Rather, the human element could be incorporated by a broadbrush approach that captured human work times and reliability as one system among many others. Likewise, these systems tended to be descriptive, not generative. If even small changes were made in the task environment, the model would have to be amended before it could perform the task. (Note that although not developed to simulate the human element in large man-machine systems, the CPM-GOMS models that were discussed earlier [Gray & Boehm-Davis, 2000; Gray et al., 1993] also have an activity network structure and also fall prey to this criticism.) However, it is very much the case that this state of affairs is changing, and the components of these architectures are increasingly based on cognitive theory. For an update on the state of affairs in this line of research, I refer the reader to the chapter by Zachary et al. (2005) as well as to recent reviews by Laughery and Lebiere (Laughery, Lebiere, & Archer, 2006; Lebiere, Archer, Warwick, & Schunk, 2005) . However, it is not clear whether this laudable drive to insert cognitive theory into these architectures could be extended to include a cognitive model of control without destroying the power of this class of hybrids.
Proprietary or otherwise restricted (POOR) hybrids (Figure 2 , Box 2.C). The last set of hybrids is of a class that causes much trouble for the author. These are hybrid architectures that are mentioned in some of the reviews (for a listing and brief description of many of these architectures, see Morrison, 2003; Pew & Mavor, 1998; Ritter et al., 2003) but appear to be proprietary architectures that are seldom used outside of the group that developed them. Published descriptions seem limited to conference proceedings or technical reports, with very little or no presence in peerreviewed publications such as Human Factors. Tutorials are nonexistent, and access to source code or runnable versions of the system is unheard of. From the outside, it is not clear how much of the humanlike behavior is based on cognitive theory and how much is based on artificial intelligence, machine learning, and mathematical algorithms plus the intuitions of the programmers. Hence, although such architectures are filling a gap not covered by better known systems, their influence in the development of new hybrid and cognitive science-based architectures seems to be limited. (I thank Kevin Gluck [personal communication, April 28, 2008] for suggesting the label and acronym for this category, which has the dual advantage of being both descriptive and emotive.)
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The application of cognitive architectures to human factors issues has had a long history but a brief past. As traced here, the long history extends back to Simon (1956) and Fitts (1954 Fitts ( , 1958 , whereas the brief past is reflected by the explosion of work in the current decade. In contrast to cognitive modeling, cognitive architectures enable us to model the role of multiple mental resources (whether multiple cognitive resources or a combination of cognitive, perceptual, and motor resources) in determining the adaptation of human performance in complex, reactive task environments.
In this article, I distinguished between two types of cognitive architectures: cognitive science architectures based on cognitive theories ( Figure  2 , Box 1) and hybrid architectures that include significant noncognitive components (Figure 2 , Box 2). The cognitive science architectures are limited by the state of the art in cognitive theory. Hence, the areas in which cognitive science lacks strong theories, such as vision (though see recent work by O'Reilly & Munakata, 2000) , language (though see Lewis, Vasishth, & Van Dyke, 2006) , stress and fatigue (though see Gunzelmann, Gluck, Kershner, Van Dongen, & Dinges, 2007; Gunzelmann, Gluck, Price, Van Dongen, & Dinges, 2007; Ritter, Reifers, Klein, & Schoelles, 2007) , and more (Anderson & Lebiere, 2003; Gray et al., 2003) , are areas in which cognitive architectures are severely limited. Attempts to bypass these limits for cognitive engineering purposes have given rise to a variety of hybrid architectures. These hybrids overcome the limits in cognitive science theory by incorporating a variety of computer-based control ideas, machine learning algorithms, or artificial intelligence techniques. In the near term, it is the hybrids that would present the best vector for introducing cognitive science theories into a renewed engineeringbased (Byrne & Gray, 2003) human factors.
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